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INTRODUCTION 30
One major legal issue in emergency procurements is the need to waive or limit statutory rules for 31 open competition to expedite the contract award (Gransberg and Loulakis 2012) . A delay in the 32 start of emergency restoration construction created by a protest of the award is potentially 33 devastating. This paper will discuss the details of that specific issue by presenting the case study 34 (MnDOT) to expedite the award of a design-build (DB) contract to replace the collapsed structure 38 (Warne 2008 ). The contract was not awarded to the lowest priced proposal, forcing MnDOT to 39 defend a protest of the award by the low bidder in court (Hietpas 2008) . MnDOT was successful 40 largely due to past DB award protest experience, which led to the agency strictly disciplining the 41 proposal evaluation process in a manner that contributed to a logical defense of the award decision 42 (Shane et al. 2006) . 43
44
When a disaster destroys a vital piece of infrastructure, like an interstate highway or a large bridge, 45 the procurement must be developed in a manner that expedites the restoration of services with the 46 shortest schedule practical. Here an emergency services restoration project is defined as "a project 47 initiated as the result of some unexpected circumstance that negatively affected or completely 48 diminished the capacity and/or level of service of a given transportation facility (road, bridge, 49 tunnel, etc.) to the point where the impact is great enough to warrant special treatment in the 50 procurement phase" (Gransberg and Loulakis 2012) . Procurement is defined as "the combined 51 functions of purchasing, inventory control, traffic and transportation, receiving, inspection, store 52 keeping, and salvage and disposal operations" (State of Minnesota 2011) . caused major damage to the horizontal infrastructure across the city. Both the central and local 60 governments considered the challenges posed by the scale of the damage significant, and it was 61 determined that a purpose-built organization was required for the rebuild (Hurley 2013; 62 LeMasurier 2015). The situation asked for a new level of collaboration which posed several unique 63 features. First, the size of the disaster meant that it was too big to handle for any one company. 64
Secondly, with the political/media coverage expected, the risk was too great for a single company. 65
And thirdly, there was a need and political and social pressure to start work immediately, before 66 the scope was entirely clear or defined. By forming a collaborative alliance that included multiple 67 construction companies, engineering consulting firms, and members of involved each 68 governmental entity with jurisdiction in the disaster area, the necessary resources were made 69 immediately available and in a form that permitted both quick and efficient employment (Botha 70 and Scheepbouwer 2015). 71
72
Expediting an emergency restoration of services project makes the selection of the appropriate 73 procurement procedure complicated. Time is of the essence, requiring agencies to give schedule 74 priority over quality and cost until the disrupted service has been restored (Houston 2011) . 75
Awarding an emergency contract is made more problematic by the high level of emotions and 76 media coverage that surrounds most emergencies. Each project delivery methods utilitzes a unique 77
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METHODOLOGY 121
Case study research is appropriate when the researcher requires an in-depth look at alternative 122 business processes (Eisenhardt 1991) . Kohn (1997) proposes that case studies are best used "to 123 describe a process or the effects of an event… especially when such events affect many different 124 parties." The expedited award of a DB mega-project under emergency circumstances qualifies 125 under both authors' propositions. Case studies are also quite useful for discovering the answers to 126 questions on the details and how circumstances influenced key decisions concerning the outcome 127 of the specific case (Yin 2009; Kohn 1997 ). As such, the use of case study research was essential 128 to capture the rationale behind the process that MnDOT developed to procure design and 129 construction of the I-35W Bridge, as well as the effect of those details that were cited in the 130 eventual protest. 131
132
The details of interest were collected via a structured interview protocol containing yes/no 133
questions, checklists and open ended questions. The interview questions were developed using the 134 process proposed by Oppenheim (1992) and coupled with a structured interview protocol adapted 135 from the one used by the Government Accountability Office (GAO 1991). The protocol focused 136 specifically on the capture of causal relationships that were unique to the emergency contract 137 award process. Interviewees were sent the case study report after the interviews to verify the 138 accuracy of the report's information. The case study interview details were also augmented when 139 appropriate from information found both in the I-35W documentation and the literature. 
Stream-lined Design-Build Process 157
The DB contract to rebuild the bridge was valued at $234 million not including Right-of-Way, etc. 158
It contained major incentives and disincentives to encourage minimizing of construction time 159 (Hietpas 2008) . The maximum amount of potential time bonuses was set at $27 million, of which 160 the design-builder eventually was awarded a total of $25 million (Warne 2008) . A project-specific 161 risk management system was designed. The agency and the design-builder collaborated on the 162 
Right-of-Way 187
The new bridge needed 3 complete and 10 partial real estate acquisitions. MnDOT executed an 188 expedited two-step process design to obtain expedited access to required parcels and preclude 189 potential right-of-way (ROW) process delays (Warne 2008 
• "Held a permitting kickoff meeting with the heads of local, state, and federal permitting 204 authorities to 'ensure buy-in from the top down'. The meeting resulted in agreements or 205 understanding on permitting approvals, mitigation expectations, and submittal requirements, 206 barriers to overcome, and a single point of contact with decision-making authority in each 207 agency." 208
• "Obtained an agreement from the resource agencies to ensure that each document was 209 immediately reviewed and comments were returned in a very timely manner." 210
• "Delegated the authority to make project scope and design decisions to the individuals who 211 managed the project and prepared the permit applications." 212
• "Took full advantage of existing programmatic agreements and categorical exclusions, 213 wherever appropriate." 214
• "Ensured that any capacity additions were for less than the mandated 1.0 mile in length to 215 avoid the requirement for an Environmental Assessment which is triggered at that length." 216
• "Convened a meeting with the competing proposers and the affected utility companies during 217 the procurement phase to furnish firsthand information on potential utility relocations rather 218 than rely on the request for information process." (Gransberg and Loulakis 2012) . 219
220

DB Project Delivery Selection Rationale 221
The MnDOT decision to use DB project delivery for the I-35W replacement bridge was made 222 based on the agency's extensive DB experience and its belief that the delivery method would 223 The urgency of the situation drove MnDOT to complete the award of the contact as rapidly as 295 practical, creating a short-term situation without sufficient "time to publish the results of the 296 evaluation before contract award or to debrief unsuccessful offerors. 297
THE PROTEST 298
An award protest was asserted, "based primarily on the fact that the winning team also submitted 299 the highest proposed price" (Gransberg and Loulakis 2012). MnDOT's rich base of DB experience 300 had also provided it with a number of opportunities to defend the correctness and integrity of its 301 DB evaluation and award process in both state and federal district courts. In each previous case, it 302 relied on a defense described in a paper by Shane et al. (2006) as follows: 303
• "The evaluation plan was completely transparent." 304
• "MnDOT followed it precisely." 305
• "MnDOT could logically defend the final award decision." 306
It is not unusual for emergency procurement procedures to lead to objections. These types of 307 objections range from mere public relations problems to the protest of an award and litigation. As 308 • The MnDOT TRC had abused its "discretion" by not awarding the contract to the proposal 331 with the lowest proposed price and shortest proposed completion date (Faegre et al. 2009 ). 332
The lawsuit was dismissed by the District Court and subsequently appealed to the Minnesota Court 333 of Appeals which upheld the lower court's dismissal as correct. Rather than describe the original 334 court decision and the appellate court decision in chronological order, the facts and logic of each 335 court with regard to the above three allegations will be combined into a separate discussion of each 336 issue. It is hoped that this technique will allow the reader to better focus on the salient points of 337 the case. 338 339
Improper Evaluation Criteria 340
The allegation contested the TRC determination that FM's winning proposal was indeed 341 responsive, thereby constituting improper evaluation criteria for two elements of the proposed 342 design. The first was that MnDOT accepted FM's proposal which included ROW outside the RFP 343 project limits. The second involved a concrete-box design using two instead of the RFP-mandated 344 three webs. The lower court did not specifically rule on the criteria themselves but instead focused 345 on the timing of the suit itself. 346
First, it noted that the suit was brought at a time when the project was nearly complete thus making 347 it "no longer justiciable" and moot due to an inability to rectify the alleged injustice if the case was 348 found for the plaintiffs. Since the Minnesota DB best value award statute specifically gives the 349 TRC the authority to make responsiveness decisions, the court ruled that the plaintiffs failed to 350
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The primary argument regarding the evaluation criteria made in the appeal was that 353 "responsiveness under the design/build best value statute must be determined exactly like 354 responsiveness is determined under traditional design-bid-build procurements" (Faegre et al. 355 2009). The appeals court interpreted that argument to mean that the plaintiffs were asserting a 356 "common-law definition of a responsive proposal" and alleging that the FM proposal "materially 357 deviated from specifications." The two alleged deviations were as follows: 358
• "The proposed work for this project shall not include additional capacity or Right of Way." 359
• "That concrete-box designs feature a minimum of three webs." (Faegre et al. 2009 ). 360
The FM design proposal included two previously approved PAEs. The first provided for a 361 temporary easement to allow FM to extend its operations outside the project limits shown in the 362 RFP. FM agreed to obtain the necessary permission itself and did so. The easement was required 363 to permit FM to optimize its proposed means and methods by staging the machinery necessary to 364 erect the bridge on a parcel of land that was not included in the MnDOT ROW acquisition plan. 365
The RFP also included a statement that permitted the design-builder to submit a written request to 366
MnDOT "if additional ROW is required" The plaintiffs pointed out that the same section in the 367 RFP also includes a passage stating: "Proposed work for this project shall not include additional 368 capacity or Right of Way." This is certainly a potential ambiguity. 369 The FHWA definition of an ATC is "a request by a proposer to modify a contract requirement, 371 specifically for that proposer's use in gaining competitive benefit during the bidding or proposal 372 process… [and] must provide a solution that is equal to or better than the owner's base design 373 requirements in the invitation for bid (IFB for DBB) or request for proposal (RFP for DB) 374 document." (FHWA 2012) . The essence of an ATC is to require "the agency to alter the baseline 375 design and/or the baseline design criteria because if no deviation is required, the concept would be 376 responsive if proposed as merely the given competitor's preferred design approach" (Gransberg et 377 al. 2013 ). Thus, the fact was that ATCs/PAEs were allowable and to qualify as an ATC, the 378 proposed changes must literally be a deviation to the "baseline criteria". The assertion that basing 379 a proposal on an approved PAE, in FM's case added ROW and a concrete-box design with only 380 two webs, was ruled to be perfectly responsive despite the potential ambiguity. 381 382
Misleading Oral Statements 383
As previously noted, the MnDOT ATC process involves confidential one-on-one discussions with 384 each competing proposer to iron out the details of ATC concepts and advance them to biddable 385 PAEs. Thus, unlike DBB procurement where every communication between the agency and one 386 of the competing contractors is publicized, DB procurements with ATCs are conducted in 387 conditions of enforced secrecy to preserve each design-builder's competitive edge (FHWA 2012) . 388
The ATC process has been integral to the MnDOT DB procurement since its inception in 2001. the MnDOT ATC/PAE process citing the fact that the RFP imposed an "equivalent design 393 requirement," and a design analysis to show that any proposed concrete-box design meet or exceed 394 the three web standard. Since FM's concrete-box design exceeded this minimum equivalent design 395 criterion, the appeal court rejected the "misleading oral statements" assertion. 396
397
TRC Discretion to Determine Responsiveness 398
The District Court determined that the statute invested the TRC with the responsibility to make 399 responsiveness determinations. The appeals court went on to cite the fact that the Minnesota state 400 best value statute (Minn. Stat §161.3426, subds. 1(a)) expressly grants authority to the TRC to 401 reject proposals that it finds to be nonresponsive. The court also opined that DB procurements, "by 402 definition, are not based on fully detailed specifications." The court concluded that those two 403 factors defined the intent of the law "to permit the TRC, by applying its judgment based on the 404 advertised selection criteria, to evaluate proposals where no finished design exists to which the 405 proposals must conform" (Faegre et al. 2009 ). In a nutshell, the court determined that "the TRC 406 has discretion in deciding whether a proposal is responsive." It also noted that the TRC's discretion 407 is not unconstrained and responsiveness determinations must be supported by the weight of the 408 evidence. Hence, the appeal was unsuccessful, and the Court of Appeals determined that there was 409 "no error of law and that substantial evidence supported the TRC's determination that Flatiron's 410 proposal was responsive, leading the court to conclude that dismissal of the lawsuit was proper" 411 (Faegre et al. 2009 ). 412
Summary of Protest Results
